Appellate panel hears challenge to Dillard's Miranda waiver; defense presses intoxication and 'minute to think' invocation

An appellate panel heard oral argument in State of Washington v. Christopher Dillard over whether statements Dillard made during a police interrogation should have been admitted at trial. Defense counsel Jared Steed said the record shows Dillard did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and asked the court to reverse. "Mister Dillard is entitled to a new trial because his power fleet prejudicial interrogation statements were admitted despite the prosecution's failure to prove that he made a knowing intelligent involuntary waiver of his constitutional rights," Steed told the court.

Steed pointed to several factors he said bear on voluntariness and comprehension: Dillard was reportedly asleep and had to be roused before questioning, he groaned and was slow to respond, he refused to sign a written waiver and repeatedly said he did not comprehend the form, and he took an unusually long time to answer basic questions ("13 seconds for him to spell his name," "another minute for him to provide officers with his address"). The defense emphasized the totality-of-the-circumstances test and cited State v. Luna to argue that appearing to understand Miranda is not the same as actually understanding it.

The State, represented by Lindsey Downs, asked the court to affirm Dillard's Assault 1 and Murder 1 convictions. "We're asking that you affirm mister Dillard's Assault 1 and Murder 1 convictions," Downs said, telling the panel that the trial record shows Dillard made uncoerced choices to speak and that he could answer factual questions about his work history and interactions. Downs further argued that even if a Miranda error occurred, it would be harmless because of substantial independent evidence: an eyewitness identifying Dillard, text messages arranging a meeting at the Big Eddy, Dillard's wallet found at the scene, DNA in the victim's vehicle, corroborating friend testimony about a black-powder firearm and an inculpatory jail call.

Judges on the panel asked repeated questions about where to draw lines between impairment sufficient to vitiate a waiver and ordinary intoxication encountered in many interrogations. A central dispute at oral argument was whether Dillard's request for a moment to think constituted an unequivocal invocation that required officers to stop questioning or whether it was an equivocal request that did not legally obligate follow-up clarification. Counsel disputed whether officers were required to ask follow-up questions in response to that formulation, and whether case law should treat equivocal statements differently for purposes of the totality analysis.

At argument's close the court thanked counsel and moved on to the next case. The panel did not announce a decision during the hearing; the judges' questioning focused on the legal standard and the import of the recorded interaction rather than an immediate indication of disposition.