Appellants Urge Court to Treat RCW 19.86.093's Three Paths as Defining Public-Interest Proof
September 11, 2026 | Other Court, Judicial , Washington
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Matthew Davis, appellants' counsel, told the court the 2009 statutory language provides three ways to prove the Consumer Protection Act's public-interest element and that those options should be treated as the statutory method for proving that element. "With respect to the Consumer Protection Act claim in 2009, the legislature passed a statute that said the party may prove the public interest element by 1 of 3 options," Davis said in opening argument.
Davis pressed a linguistic point the panel returned to repeatedly: "If you say something may be something, that's a status or a potential status," he argued, saying the phrasing was not the permissive choice the judges suggested. A panel member responded that the phrasing could be construed to give plaintiffs an alternative to the existing Hangman Ridge factors, calling it a possible lowering of the hurdle: "It seems like they lowered the bar," the judge observed.
Davis said the statute did not mention Hangman Ridge and that adopting the judges' alternative reading would render the statute meaningless: if parties could always rely on Hangman Ridge as well, then the statute would not have the effect it describes. The exchange focused on whether RCW 19.86.093 supplants, explains, or simply coexists with the Hangman Ridge evidentiary framework, with counsel urging the court to read the statute as defining the public-interest routes available to plaintiffs.
Why it matters: The panel's interpretation will affect how private plaintiffs demonstrate consumer-harm in future CPA litigation, potentially altering the practical proof burdens in cases alleging unfair or deceptive acts.
The court heard additional argument on related issues and then moved on to respondent argument; the case was ultimately submitted for decision at the end of the calendar.
Davis pressed a linguistic point the panel returned to repeatedly: "If you say something may be something, that's a status or a potential status," he argued, saying the phrasing was not the permissive choice the judges suggested. A panel member responded that the phrasing could be construed to give plaintiffs an alternative to the existing Hangman Ridge factors, calling it a possible lowering of the hurdle: "It seems like they lowered the bar," the judge observed.
Davis said the statute did not mention Hangman Ridge and that adopting the judges' alternative reading would render the statute meaningless: if parties could always rely on Hangman Ridge as well, then the statute would not have the effect it describes. The exchange focused on whether RCW 19.86.093 supplants, explains, or simply coexists with the Hangman Ridge evidentiary framework, with counsel urging the court to read the statute as defining the public-interest routes available to plaintiffs.
Why it matters: The panel's interpretation will affect how private plaintiffs demonstrate consumer-harm in future CPA litigation, potentially altering the practical proof burdens in cases alleging unfair or deceptive acts.
The court heard additional argument on related issues and then moved on to respondent argument; the case was ultimately submitted for decision at the end of the calendar.
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