Christina Jaccard, counsel for the respondent and cross-appellant Hayden Lazycki, told the Division 3 panel that the 2019–2020 amendments to the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act allow a tenant to reinstate a tenancy by paying the amounts specified in RCW 59.18.410(2) before the entry of a money judgment. "The landlord entirely mischaracterizes reinstatement as a right that's available only after the court has entered a money judgment," Jaccard said, arguing the statute's plain language and legislative history are dispositive.
Jaccard told the court the statute makes reinstatement automatic upon payment of the statutorily identified elements and that those amounts "do not include a landlord's unawarded attorney's fees." She said tenants can calculate what they owe from written rental agreements and statutory notice; if the parties dispute whether the tender was sufficient, the trial court can adjudicate that dispute after the tender is made. Jaccard also relied on RCW 59.18.293(a), arguing that the statute bars fee awards where a tenant failed to respond to an order to show cause, and on precedent (Nagash v. Sawyer) holding that a pro se notice of appearance that only details payment efforts is not an answer for jurisdictional purposes.
The panel asked follow-up questions about the meaning of terms such as "restore" or "reinstated" in the statute and whether a tenancy is considered lost at filing of an unlawful detainer. Jaccard responded that a valid termination notice can terminate tenancy by operation of law but that a tenant may avoid unlawful detainer status by reinstating under the statute before judgment is entered. The case was submitted after rebuttal arguments.
The article is based on the parties' oral argument; no decision was announced from the bench.