Appellate panel hears challenge to termination of parental rights in ONRA case

An appellate panel of the Other Court heard oral argument in an appeal of an order terminating the parental rights of JA to his daughter, ONRA. Counsel for the father and for the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) focused on two central questions: whether the state proved the father was currently unfit to parent, and whether DCYF offered or provided court-ordered services while he was incarcerated.

Stephanie Taplin, counsel for the appellant, told the panel that the state failed to meet its burden of proving the father was currently unfit and failed to show it offered or provided all court-ordered services. "The state does not just get to point that a parent is temporarily physically absent and say that that is sufficient to render them unfit," Taplin said, arguing that incarceration alone is not equivalent to unfitness under Washington law.

Taplin pressed the panel to treat parental fitness as a distinct, constitutionally required inquiry that must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. She argued the record does not clearly support an implied finding of parental unfitness and noted the trial court's credibility findings about the father's wife and other witnesses. Taplin also told the court that the father had been incarcerated at Monroe since November 2024 and that the trial court nonetheless ordered a substance-use disorder assessment, parenting instruction and random UAs to be provided while he was confined; she said DCYF presented no evidence at trial that outside providers could not have delivered those services.

A judge on the panel asked how the length of incarceration and the child's age should factor into the fitness assessment. Taplin said the relevant inquiry is whether the parent can meet the child's basic needs "despite that incarceration," and argued the father could do so by parenting alongside his wife and by voluntarily engaging in random UAs while incarcerated.

Lauren Danskin, Assistant Attorney General for DCYF, urged the panel to affirm the termination. Danskin said the record establishes DCYF offered the required services throughout the dependency proceedings—substance-use evaluations, parenting instruction and random testing—and that the father repeatedly failed to avail himself of them while in the community. Danskin also told the court that trial evidence showed the father had not demonstrated sustained sobriety in the community and that the trial court found his deficiencies were unlikely to be cured within the child's foreseeable future; the department noted a trial finding that the father faced roughly 15 more months of incarceration at the time of trial.

On the question of services while incarcerated, Danskin and counsel debated whether correctional facilities at Monroe made the ordered services reasonably available and whether DCYF had an obligation to secure outside providers. Counsel cited prior appellate decisions (transcribed as JHW, GHW and other citations) in arguing how those precedents apply; the panelists repeatedly noted those cases are fact-specific about what services correctional facilities provide and about the department's obligations.

Both sides stressed the centrality of the trial court's credibility determinations. Danskin emphasized that the plan for the father's wife to assume parenting responsibilities was not developed or tested at trial and that the trial court found her testimony not persuasive; Taplin replied that those credibility determinations should not be treated as dispositive if the court applied an incorrect legal standard about fitness for incarcerated parents.

At the close of argument, Taplin asked the panel to reverse the termination and return the matter for further proceedings; Danskin asked the court to affirm. The transcript of the hearing does not record a ruling or an immediate decision by the panel.

The appeal centers on statutory and constitutional questions about "current parental fitness" under Washington law and the practical obligations of child-welfare agencies to offer court-ordered services to incarcerated parents. The court's eventual decision will determine whether the termination order remains in effect or whether the case must be remanded for further proceedings.