Court hears argument over whether CJTC immunity covers instructor's off‑campus harassment

Shannon Kilpatrick, counsel for appellants Hayden Wagner and Amy Allen, told the court it should reverse the trial court’s summary‑judgment ruling for the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission and decide that the immunity statute does not shield the Commission from claims arising out of alleged harassment by an instructor.

“We’re here to ask this court to reverse the trial court’s order of summary judgment to the Criminal Justice Training Commission,” Kilpatrick said, arguing the statutory immunity requires a link to the Commission’s official duties that is missing in the record for several off‑campus incidents.

Kilpatrick said the record includes multiple incidents that occurred off campus — for example at a gym — and conduct that violated the Commission’s anti‑fraternization and training policies. She urged the court to interpret the statute so that acts performed for the instructor’s private gratification, or that contravene explicit Commission rules, are not treated as immunized official acts.

Beth McIntyre, counsel for the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission, countered that the legislature has granted the Commission broad immunity under the applicable RCW provisions and that this court’s precedents (including Salvo and Ent, as discussed in argument) have read that immunity broadly. She said administrative choices about supervision, training and enforcement at the Basic Law Enforcement Academy fall within the Commission’s duties and therefore are protected.

“There may be immunity there,” McIntyre acknowledged in response to hypotheticals about serious off‑duty misconduct, but she emphasized the controlling inquiry is the function the actor was performing and the Commission’s administrative decisions about training and supervision. McIntyre repeatedly told the court that, even while the Commission does not condone the instructor’s alleged actions, the question is whether the Commission can be sued under these theories given the immunity statute.

The judges pressed both sides with hypotheticals about on‑campus training versus off‑campus encounters and about whether conduct that violates internal policies (for example, using improper frisk techniques) nonetheless could be part of an official act. Counsel for the appellants said some incidents were plainly outside the scope of authorized training and were committed for personal reasons; counsel for the Commission said policy decisions and the administration of the Academy are quintessentially official functions.

Kilpatrick closed by noting the clash between the state’s anti‑discrimination statute (WLAD) and the immunity statute and asked the court to reverse so those statutory tensions can be resolved on the merits. The court thanked counsel and concluded the calendar for the day.

The court’s decision will turn on how it reads the statutory language drawing the line between protected official acts and non‑official conduct — particularly when misconduct occurs outside academy premises or in a manner expressly prohibited by Commission rules.