Appellants tell court judge should have disclosed ties to state Attorney General; State urges deference to trial ruling

Appellants' attorney Phil Tallmadge told the appellate panel that the trial court erred both procedurally and substantively in denying a Rule 60(b) motion, arguing it applied a "clear, cogent, convincing" standard where a preponderance standard should apply and required proof of a constitutional injury or quid pro quo relationship.

"There is an unambiguous duty to disclose on the part of a judge," Tallmadge said, urging the court to reverse on the ground that Judge Michael Scott did not disclose substantial, recent connections with the Attorney General's Office that appellants say parties would reasonably consider relevant to disqualification.

Tallmadge emphasized that disclosure obligations flow from the comment to Rule 2.11 and that disclosure is the mechanism that allows litigants to "intelligently exercise" the statutory right to file an affidavit of prejudice. He argued the Flowers matter involved the same division of the Attorney General's Office and that, he said, "intensive" professional interactions, public appearances and endorsement letters within months of Judge Scott's appointment made the relationships newly relevant to litigants.

The State's attorney, Laura Clinton, responded that the Flowers litigation was factually distinct from the CLA trial and that none of the Flowers attorneys appeared as advocates in the CLA proceedings. "In 2020, after a 7 day trial, Judge Scott found that CLA, the appellants here, were running a trust mill scheme in the State of Washington and praying on elderly voters," Clinton said, and she urged the panel to defer to the trial court's factual findings.

Clinton also cited precedent (including State v. Carlson as discussed at argument) to contend that routine campaign support, letters of recommendation and ordinary professional contacts do not by themselves establish a duty to disclose or evidence of judicial bias. She told the court that a sworn declaration from Deputy Bowers in the record asserted there was "nothing irregular" about the Flowers matter.

Panel members pressed both sides on timeliness and the appropriate standard for extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b)(11). One questioner asked why appellants waited years to raise the issue; Tallmadge replied that some investigations require time and outside work and pointed to controlling cases that allow consideration of delayed claims in appropriate circumstances. The State said the appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record, including timeliness or the trial court's discretionary rulings.

On rebuttal, Tallmadge corrected what he called factual errors in the State's presentation and reiterated that the trial court applied the higher standard and required a constitutional injury and quid pro quo; he asked the panel to reverse and remand. The argument concluded when the court recessed.

The panel did not issue a ruling during the session; the court took the matter under advisement and recessed following oral argument.