In the question‑and‑answer period following the executive order signing, reporters asked about Treasury lifting sanctions on Iranian oil and whether proceeds could be used to rebuild Iran’s military. The President said that, if sanctions were lifted, the money would be used to buy food "exclusively through the United States from our farmers," naming corn and soybeans as likely purchases.
A reporter asked whether the administration could ensure proceeds would not rebuild Iran’s military. The President responded that he would "see" how the arrangement is monitored and said, "If Iran does not...live up to their agreement...I will do what I have to do," adding the U.S. would act if necessary. He also repeatedly characterized Iran’s military capability as substantially degraded, asserting (in a series of remarks) that Iran’s navy and air force were "gone," that leadership tiers were eliminated and that much of Iran's missile and drone manufacturing capacity had been destroyed — statements presented in the transcript as the President’s claims and not independently corroborated there.
National cyber director Sean Karen Cross, earlier in the event, had highlighted the security risks quantum will introduce for cryptography and the need to balance innovation with protection of critical systems. That cybersecurity framing was part of the administration’s rationale for the post‑quantum cryptography order but separate from the Iran discussion.
The transcript records reporters pressing for clarification. The President repeatedly characterized the U.S. posture as one of leverage, said the U.S. controls the Strait of Hormuz and defended the administration’s negotiating approach. The record does not include outside verification of the President’s quantitative claims about Iran’s military losses or a detailed monitoring plan for how oil‑sale proceeds would be restricted to food purchases; those points remain assertions on the record.
Next procedural steps were not announced during the event; reporters continued to press on multiple foreign‑policy fronts.