San Antonio council hears NTSB briefing after Preston Hollow gas explosions; CPS Energy outlines response and limits on public commentary

San Antonio City Council convened a special session June 22 to review emergency protocols and the cityand utility response to the April 21 gas explosions in Preston Hollow Drive, hearing a presentation from CPS Energy and city staff and taking public comment from affected residents.

Frank Calmeris, identified in the session as president of CPS Energy, told the council that CPS "ha sido y continuarsiendo tan transparente como pueda ser," while cautioning that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) controls investigative releases and that litigation constraints limit what staff can discuss publicly. City staff summarized the NTSBprocess as two phases: an immediate physical-facts phase and a later analytic phase. The briefing noted the preliminary report released May 21 and said the full investigation could take 12 to 24 months.

The presenters gave a factual timeline from the NTSBpreliminary report: two explosions on April 21 (first at about 6:04 p.m., a second about 8:25 p.m.), significant damage to two residences, serious injuries to three occupants and one CPS employee, and emergency response steps including CPS isolating the leak and disconnecting service on April 22. CPS and investigators conducted onsite testing in the days after the incident and turned removed pipe sections over to the NTSB for evaluation.

City Administrator Mareda Villagf3mez outlined community supports established after the incident: a reunification center at the Northeast Senior Center, transportation assistance, debris cleanup and barricades at the scene, property security, mental-health supports and a city resource webpage. Staff said they collected contact information for about 175 residents for follow-up and coordinated distribution of a limited inventory of residential gas detectors.

Diana Harding, the city's community engagement official, described outreach and services for impacted families, including coordination with CPS and support for short-term housing through hotels or arrangements such as Airbnb when needed. An operations official from CPS (introduced as Ginette Ramedrez) described CPS operations and public guidance: CPS handles thousands of annual emergency calls, maintains a 30-minute response standard for reported leaks, and encourages residents to call 9-1-1 if they believe they smell gas and to use 8-1-1 before excavation.

Council members pressed staff and CPS on operational coordination and public messaging. Several council members said residents received inconsistent guidance about whether they could return to homes and asked why activation of the Emergency Operations Center (IOC/EOC) did not occur; staff said IOC activation depends on criteria such as multi-agency sustained involvement, life-safety impacts and duration beyond 24 hours. Staff also said some specific operational details (including certain investigative facts and any determinations of probable cause) remain under NTSB control until the agency releases them.

The city announced it would continue to cooperate with NTSB and provide public updates within those constraints. Council convened an executive session for legal matters later in the meeting and recessed; upon return, officials said no public action had been taken in the closed session and adjourned.

Ending: The session closed with council and staff agreeing to follow up with affected residents, continue coordination with NTSB, and explore strengthened communications and training for neighborhood-centered emergencies.