Justices Hear Whether Medical Malpractice Act Shields Hospitals from Nurses’ Errors

During oral argument, Larry Montano, counsel for Health Services LLC, told the court that the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) "is remedial legislation that is critical to the viability of New Mexico's health care system," and urged the court to hold that a hospital qualified under the MMA is entitled to the act's protections for vicarious-liability claims arising from employed nurses.

Montano said Loveless is a qualified health care provider, carries required insurance and has paid into the patient compensation fund, and that plaintiffs are attempting to "contort" the statute to avoid the MMA's coverage. He relied on the court's prior discussion in Baker and on respondeat superior principles, arguing that vicarious-liability claims against a hospital "fit neatly" within the statute's definition of a malpractice claim.

Opposing counsel Kathy Love (joined by Katie Curry) told the court that Baker v. Hedstrom and the statutory text counsel a narrower reading. Respondents argued the legislature originally drafted the MMA to address an insurance problem for individual providers and that hospitals were not the target of the 1977 reforms. Counsel outlined three distinct ways a hospital may be sued—ordinary negligence, direct medical negligence, and vicarious liability—and said the statute's structure and legislative history matter to how courts apply caps and other MMA protections.

Throughout argument justices pressed both sides on close textual points. Justice Bacon and others asked whether the list of practitioners in the MMA excludes registered nurses and whether deciding that hospitals are covered would require the court also to declare nurses to be qualified health care providers. Counsel for Loveless answered that because this case is a vicarious-liability claim against the hospital, the court need not reach the separate question of whether nurses themselves are listed QHPs.

The court also probed potential practical consequences if vicarious claims were excluded—for example, whether plaintiffs could circumvent the MMA by suing multiple individual employees even when the hospital is the practical defendant. Counsel disputed how far an opinion should go in changing existing practice and whether later statutory amendments should affect the interpretation of the original statute.

Neither side asked the court to resolve broader unrelated claims; both repeatedly urged the bench to limit any ruling to the certified question. The argument invoked prior decisions including Wilshinsky v. Medina and Baker v. Hedstrom and cited statutory subsections (discussion during argument referenced subsection C and paragraph 31/32 of Baker) as the text the court should interpret.

Argument concluded for the petitioner and respondents began; the court heard extended questioning and did not issue a ruling from the bench. The justices will take the matter under advisement and issue an opinion in due course.