Ken Masters, attorney for appellant Karsha Presley, told the appeals panel that the central question on appeal is whether the failure-to-enforce exception to the public duty doctrine applies and, if so, whether the city owed Presley a duty as a matter of law. "The city therefore owes my client the duty as a matter of law," Masters said, arguing three elements must be met: (1) government agents had actual knowledge of a statutory violation; (2) they failed to take corrective action despite a statutory duty; and (3) the plaintiff was within the class the statute was intended to protect.
Masters said Detective Montemayor testified officers knew by Nov. 16, 2021, that Drayton Miller had killed a person identified in the record as Valladolid and that officers did not locate or arrest Miller before a later killing of Mr. Pace. "They could have gotten a warrant," Masters told the court, adding that his expert testified arrest was the only appropriate law-enforcement action in the circumstances and that the department failed to take required investigative steps.
The panel probed whether the department manual sets fixed timelines or mandatory actions that would transform internal policy into a duty enforceable under the exception. One judge observed that a jury ordinarily decides whether officers acted reasonably, and asked where, if anywhere, the manual specifies a deadline or mandatory arrest requirement. Masters replied that certain provisions require completion of defined investigative steps and that the reasonableness of delaying interviews or arrests is for the jury to decide.
Jeff Grendel, counsel for the city of Renton, urged the court to affirm summary judgment. "Washington law has long recognized that law-enforcement functions of keeping the peace and arresting those who commit crimes is a duty owed to the general public, not an actionable duty owed to any specific person," Grendel said, arguing the superior court correctly held the department's policy manual did not create a statutory duty under the failure-to-enforce exception.
Grendel relied on precedent, including Oliver v. Cook, and distinguished cases where statutes expressly authorize administrative rulemaking. He said the Renton ordinance grants the police chief authority to create internal policy as an executive function and pointed to an express disclaimer in the manual stating it is for internal use and not intended to create civil or criminal liability. "Those portions are quoted in the city's summary judgment motion," Grendel told the panel.
The judges questioned whether frequent updates to a manual or an express disclaimer foreclose treating a provision as a delegated legislative rule. Grendel argued regular revisions and the manner of adoption support the city's position that the manual lacks the force of law. He also disputed the plaintiff's reading of the murder statutes, saying those statutes protect the general public rather than a circumscribed class, a distinction he urged the court to consider in resolving the third element of the exception.
In rebuttal, Masters pointed the panel to record evidence (CP 106) and argued the regulations at issue were adopted under delegation from the Renton City Council and had not been changed in the record since adoption. He repeated that Mr. Pace fell within the class the statute is intended to protect and asked the court to reverse and remand.
The court took the matter under advisement after oral argument and recessed. The panel did not announce a decision at the hearing.