Nevada proposes broad election-administration changes and eases network limits on signature-verification devices

Mark Velaschin, deputy secretary of state for elections, summarized proposed regulation R090-25P as a compilation of about 19 separate regulatory changes intended to improve security, transparency and the administration of elections across Nevada.

Velaschin highlighted many changes: a clarified interpretation of 'clerical errors' for canvasses; a requirement that complaints use the Elections Integrity Violation Report form; altering candidate sample-ballot distribution so copies are made available to candidates upon request rather than mailed automatically; tighter petition-circulator affidavit language attesting that signers were registered voters; expanded electronic-roster testing requirements; modifications to retrieval-team chain-of-custody reporting; and additional post-election reporting requirements including counts of mail ballots received, counted and tabulated before, on and after Election Day.

On a technical point that drew a public comment earlier in the workshop, Velaschin said section 7 would remove the current regulation that an electronic device used to verify mail-ballot signatures "only be connected to a computer network for maintenance and support." He said the change was requested by county election officials because the restriction "negates the ability to use that automatic signature verification machine, for testing, for practice mock elections, and for... critical test processes and training leading up to the election." The agency framed the change as allowing legitimate operational uses (testing, training and mock elections) that previously were constrained by the network restriction.

Oscar Williams, a caller during general public comment, had urged the state to classify the BlueCrest sorter and automated signature-verification equipment as "critical election infrastructure" and to adopt regulatory safeguards, saying automation has reduced the human element in signature verification. Velaschin acknowledged the comment and noted staff would follow up on regulatory frameworks relating to automatic signature verification.

Other technical clarifications in R090 include adjusted risk-limiting audit coverage (one race for state or federal office and one race for county office), a requirement that counties provide an estimate of recount costs by 5 p.m. the day before the start of early in-person voting, and an explicit certification expectation that software and operating systems meet or exceed the standards of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.

Public comment on R090 was closed at the workshop with no callers; Velaschin said written comments already submitted are in the record and that staff will consider oral and written feedback before any adoption-stage changes.