Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Corner Post Case Over When APA Limitations Period Begins

The Supreme Court heard argument on whether the six‑year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) begins when a particular plaintiff is first injured by an agency rule or when the agency finalized that rule. Petitioner’s counsel, Mister Weir, told the court that Corner Post opened for business in February 2018 and "paid several hundred thousand dollars in debit‑card fees that it thinks are unlawful," and he argued that the limitations clock should start when a plaintiff first pays such fees and is therefore harmed.

Government counsel, Mister Snyder, said that for decades courts of appeals have run §2401(a)’s period from the date of the challenged agency action and that doing otherwise would destabilize reliance interests and create incentives for late‑formed entities to relitigate long‑settled regulatory schemes. "Nothing in the APA or section 2401(a) requires that destabilizing result," Snyder told the justices.

Petitioner presented three core arguments. First, he urged textual interpretation: when a cause of action "first accrues," petitioner said, the phrase should be read in light of this Court’s precedents to mean accrual when a plaintiff can sue — that is, when it has suffered harm. Second, he argued the government has no textual foothold to treat §2401(a) as a repose‑style rule that starts for everyone on the date of agency action. Third, petitioner said policy concerns about litigation long after rulemaking should be addressed by Congress rather than by judicially crafting exceptions to ordinary accrual doctrines.

The justices pressed both sides on practical consequences. Several asked whether a rule that starts the limitations period on agency adoption would bar as‑applied challenges and whether petitioning for rulemaking offers an adequate substitute remedy. Counsel for Corner Post said as‑applied relief remains available in enforcement contexts and that petitions for rulemaking are neither guaranteed nor an adequate substitute because agencies decide whether to act and often receive deferential review when they decline.

Government counsel emphasized stability and pointed to what he described as consistent appellate practice: "When you look at how Congress has approached accrual when it's dealt with similar kinds of claims, it would reasonably have expected courts to follow the same approach when applying section 2401(a)," Snyder said. He also raised practical concerns that allowing late‑arising challengers could, in some contexts such as permits or land‑management decisions, substantially expand litigation years after final agency actions.

The bench probed edge cases. Justices asked how the rule would apply to a newly formed corporation that seeks to challenge rules adopted before its incorporation, whether a plaintiff could sue pre‑opening if it had concrete plans to begin accepting regulated transactions, and what relief would be available to an unregulated party seeking vacatur of a rule that governs others.

Both sides cited this Court’s precedents while disputing their applicability. Petitioner invoked precedents interpreting "first accrues" and the APA’s presumption in favor of judicial review; the government cited cases and congressional practice it said call for accrual at final agency action. The justices repeatedly returned to two competing concerns: the right of an injured party to a day in court versus the public‑policy interest in repose and predictable regulatory rules.

At argument’s end counsel for Corner Post offered a brief rebuttal reiterating that accrual should track the first concrete harm to a particular plaintiff and that, even if the Court adopted an "imminence" test instead of actual harm, the practical difference would usually be small. The case was then submitted for decision.

The Court will decide whether §2401(a) operates as petitioner urges — with a plaintiff‑specific accrual point tied to the first concrete injury — or whether the government’s approach, which runs the clock from the date of the final agency action, should control. The ruling could affect how and when regulated and unregulated parties may seek judicial review of longstanding agency rules.