Whatcom County trains election observers on ballot handling, signature checks and security

Whatcom County Auditor Stacy Henthorn and election staff held an observer training explaining how the county processes returned ballots, conducts pre‑ and post‑election audits, and protects ballot integrity.

The training, presented by Election Supervisor Becca Rouse with participation from Chief Deputy Auditor Amy Graysher, described a 12‑step ballot‑processing workflow that begins with collection of returned ballots and ends with tabulation and reporting of results. The session covered in‑person observation rules, the county's envelope sorting and signature‑verification process, scanning and adjudication of ballots, hand counts and risk‑limiting audits, and security controls for tabulation equipment and storage.

Why it matters: The training sets expectations for members of the public, political parties and media who observe ballot processing, clarifies how Whatcom County verifies voter signatures and resolves rejected ballots, and explains safeguards used to prevent tampering or premature release of results.

The county described two observation options: attend in person at the Election Center, Suite B03, during designated ballot processing hours (typically 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Monday–Friday from when ballots are mailed until certification) or view five livestream webcams available 24/7 from the logic‑and‑accuracy test through certification. In‑person observers sign an oath, log time in/out, wear an observer badge, and must remain in designated observer areas. Observers may ask questions of supervisory staff but must not handle ballots or equipment, photograph voted ballots, use cell phones inside the center, or otherwise disrupt the process.

The training laid out the 12 steps of ballot processing the office uses: (1) collecting returned ballots from the post office, courthouse drop boxes and off‑site official drop boxes; (2) sorting returned envelopes by return method; (3) running envelopes through a Runbeck Agilis envelope sorter or manual batching when envelopes cannot be machine processed; (4) human signature verification by trained full‑time staff who received training from the Washington State Patrol fraud division; (5) a second pass through the sorter that slices open envelopes for accepted ballots and groups accepted ballots into target groups; (6) a signature review and audit of rejected envelopes; (7) separating ballots from security sleeves and shuffling groups so votes are not tied to envelopes; (8) inspecting and laying ballots flat and counting them against the group target card; (9) random group audits and duplication of damaged ballots using the accessible voting unit if necessary; (10) scanning ballots and storing scanned images on an air‑gapped secure server, then sealing scanned groups in tamper‑evident bags; (11) adjudication of overvotes, undervotes and write‑ins using Washington State voter‑intent guidance and referral of unclear intent to the canvassing board; and (12) tabulating and reporting results, with results display disabled in the tabulation system until enabled by a password and transfer to the public website via secure flash drive after 8 p.m. on election day.

The office described how rejected envelopes are audited and how voters are contacted. Ballots rejected after the second review trigger notifications by letter, phone, email or text if the voter provided contact information; voters have until 4:30 p.m. on the day before certification to resolve a signature problem. Rejected envelopes are kept separate, audited multiple times, and may be referred to the canvassing board for final determination—only the canvassing board can reject a ballot.

Security and continuity procedures were described: tabulation servers and ballot tabulation equipment are air‑gapped (not connected to the county network or Internet); results are transferred to the Internet by secure flash drive only after 8 p.m.; vendor technicians are always accompanied by authorized staff when on site; two authorized full‑time staff are required to open the Election Center door while ballots are present; and sealed bags of scanned ballots are stored in a secure vault and only opened by the canvassing board or by court order.

The training also covered audits. The logic‑and‑accuracy test (required by the Revised Code of Washington and the Washington Administrative Code) uses a prepared test deck scanned before the election and is, for federal and state contests, attended and certified by the Office of the Secretary of State. Post‑election procedures include a hand count the Thursday after election day (party representatives select sample groups and contests) and a risk‑limiting audit that samples ballots until statistical confidence in the apparent winner is reached; the county described a 5% risk limit example.

Operational facts provided during the training: as of the date cited by staff, Whatcom County had 168,376 active registered voters (3,427 military and overseas voters), 176 precincts, 20 off‑site drop boxes plus three courthouse boxes, and two working public locations in the courthouse (Suite 103 for voting center services and Suite B03 for ballot processing). During a general election, the office may hire up to about 40 temporary workers to serve as ballot collectors, customer service staff and opening board members; an additional team of temporary workers locks each off‑site drop box at 8 p.m. on election day.

This session was presented as training and informational; no formal votes or policy decisions were taken during the meeting. Observers were reminded of the office's online observer resources page with schedules, an observer guide, canvassing board guidelines, a ballot‑path video, and live‑stream links.

The county encouraged observers to direct questions to the auditor, the chief deputy auditor or the election supervisor—those officials are the authorized spokespersons for election matters—and said ballot processing will proceed whether observers are present or not.

For readers: the county posted schedules for ballot processing, logic‑and‑accuracy tests, hand counts, RLAs and canvassing board meetings on its website and said canvassing board meetings are open to the public.