The court heard arguments over whether the evidence against Xavier Randall was sufficient to prove he participated as a principal or accomplice in a drive‑by shooting.
Defense counsel Lisa Elmer, speaking “on behalf of Xavier Randall,” told the court the central question is whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt by reasonable inference that Randall “participated as a principal or accomplice in the shooting.” Elmer said there was no direct evidence anyone saw Randall fire the gun and that the record relies largely on circumstantial evidence such as DNA and vehicle presence. “His DNA was on the gun. Did he shoot it? Maybe, maybe not,” she said during rebuttal.
The prosecutor, Mister Roberts, responded that the jury was instructed on accomplice liability and that the combination of DNA recovered from a box of ammunition inside a Dodge Neon, DNA on a firearm found near the flight path, partial ballistic links, video and dash‑cam footage and evidence of flight together permitted a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “We don’t need to put the gun in his hand pulling the trigger,” Roberts said, arguing that circumstantial evidence can carry the same weight as direct evidence.
Why this matters: the issue presented asks the court to review whether a factfinder could reasonably infer that Randall aided or agreed to aid the shooters rather than merely having been present or in possession of a firearm. Judges pressed both sides on how to treat competing plausible inferences and whether the “totality of the circumstances” supports accomplice liability.
The court interrupted several times for clarifying questions about the accomplice instruction and the timing of flight, and Judge Diaz asked counsel to tie together how DNA, vehicle association and flight form a coherent theory of aiding and abetting. The argument concluded with Elmer urging the court to apply precedent limiting pyramiding of inferences and Roberts urging deference to the jury’s credibility and inference choices.
The court did not issue a ruling at the conclusion of today's oral argument.