Defense urges court not to 'pyramid' circumstantial inferences in Randall appeal

During rebuttal, defense counsel Lisa Elmer pressed the court to reject what she described as pyramiding of inferences in the prosecution’s case.

Elmer said the evidence that Randall was in a car with three others, that shots were fired from a vehicle, that his DNA was on a gun and that he fled does not, by reasonable inference, prove he participated in the shooting. She cited appellate precedents the defense believes constrain drawing guilt from a chain of speculative inferences and told the court she would rest on the briefs.

The bench questioned whether the existence of equally plausible explanations undermines the sufficiency of the state's theory under the standard of review. Elmer answered that plausibility alone is not enough to meet the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by reasonable inference, and urged the court to follow cases that reversed convictions where possession or proximity were not enough to show intent or assistance.

Elmer framed the central legal issue as whether the circumstantial facts left after removing direct‑evidence theories (for example, someone actually seen firing a gun) are sufficient to sustain a conviction on accomplice liability.